Nearly forty years ago, I was a student of philosophy at Heidelberg in Germany and heard much about the so-called "epistemological subject". It is, as Heinrich Rickert himself once formulated, "just like a geometrical point in an epistemological space". At first, I was quite amazed at this superhumanly abstract image of the knowing man, but later on I found out that this superhumanly idealized image of the human intellectual ego is deeply rooted in the Western tradition of philosophical thinking, in modern times classically represented by the Kantian "transcendental ego". If such is the only legitimate concept of the cognitive subject, there can correspondingly be one and only one right way of our cognition of nature, and it was for Kant the Newtonian physics. On this point, however, we are today forced to think differently. In fact, man's cognitive behavior toward nature has always been more flexible, but an established culture often has its own rigid frame of mind, which needs to be broken from time to time. Now it may be time to re-examine man's cognitive behavior toward nature as a whole. Among the criticisms raised against the above arguments concerning the group-like structure of the color circle and of the vowel triangle, the most serious one was the following.-What would be the result, if we mix two just distinguish able color-or vowel-elements, say A and B ? Then the mixture we get there by will be neither distinguishable from A nor from B, and so the analogy with the mathematical group concept breaks down. Very true indeed ! Precisely that is why I don't speak of a group, but of a group-like structure. In it I do not see the What is then the logico-epistemological principle which specifically characterizes mathematical thinking in general ? Let us take a look at one of the most popular textbooks of mathematical logic of today, Hilbert-Ackermann's. Written in terms of negation and disjunction v, the four axioms of its propositional logic are:
(1) (xvx)vx, Then we see that the original four axioms are now reducible to the following one mathematical formula: _??_XivXi, which means nothing else than the n-time ap plication of the logical principle of the excluded middle to the world of discourse.
From the standpoint of ordinary experience, there is something humanly very natural in this way of thinking crudely dichotomic of the classical logic. It is quite natural, therefore, that the whole scientific development in modern times, above all the classical Newtonian physics, was ultimately based upon this dichtomic principle. By the same token, however, it is also quite understand able that this logico-epistemological principle of clear-cut dichotomy proved to be inadequate for describing microphysical experience now open to science. On the other hand, we saw already that this strictly dichotomic framework of experience did not entirely fit our sense perception. We saw namely that the mixture of two just distinguishable perceptual elements, say A and B, cannot yield any new element with both qualities of A and B, and distinguishable from both A and B, as it should be according to the principle of clear-cut dichotomy.
It is indeed remarkable that a similar logico-epistemological difficulty arises in two apparently so different fields as sense perception and microphysics. One of the most striking results of contemprory physics is that light rays which had firmly been believed to be waves, were found to have also some irrefutable evidence for being of particle nature, and electrons which have been no less firmly believed to be charged particles with a definite mass, show, on the contrary, some indubitable characteristics of wave nature. All in all, one thing may now be regarded as established:
the world of our classical science of nature based upon the dichotomic principle of the exculded middle is delimited at both ends, as it were, at its lower end by the world of sense perception and at its upper end by the world of modern physics.
We are thus coming to divide the whole world of our external knowledge into three specific worlds, which structurally differ in their basic modes of experience from one another. Let us tentatively call them "the world of sense perception", "the world of classical physics" , and "the world of modern physics" respectively, representing them, for covenience' sake, by P,C, and M in the following diagrams, and think about possible relationships among them: The first diagram faithfully reflects the whole process of the ever expanding science of nature from P to C and from C to M. This is a particular relationship of one-sided inclusion, justifiable only from the theoretical viewpoint of physical science.
The second diagram just tries to correct this one-sidedness, and transforms the whole into a figure of three symmetrically overlapping circles. It certainly does justice to the relative independence of P, C, and M, but if we consider the peculiar circumstance that any experimental contact between P and M so far is only possible through mediation by C, we have to strike out its PM-area, or better rearrange the whole into an entirely new figure like the third diagram, which does not contain any PM-area from the outset. portant than their basic interdependence. Such a multiplicity of cognitive behavior necessarily requires a corresponding flexibility of mind, a kind of intellectual mobility among these three possibilities. With due efforts, we can switch over, so to speak, from one behavior to another, as circumstances demand. The scientific investigation of nature need not be bound to any rigid standpoint in phiolsophical epistemology. Scientific phiolsophy has to do justice to the ever changing situation of human knowledge with that admirable flexibility which has always been one of the most distinctive characteristics of human intelligence. (Received Jan. 16, 1968) 
